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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT D. KLEIN,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Case No. 13994

vs.
MARY AVALON KLEIN,
Defendant and
Respondent•
B R I E F

OF

R E S P O N D E N T

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The Appellant is appealing from that certain Judgment made and entered pursuant to Stipulation of the parties
on the 18th day of December, 1974.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY THE LOWER COURT
The Appellant commenced the divorce action in 1971.
The Respondent was granted a Decree of Divorce on her Counterclaim in final amended form on November 22, 197 2.

An appeal

was taken, and on July 5, 1973, this Court made and entered
its Decision with respect to that appeal.

Klein v. Klein, 30

Utah 2d 1, 511 P.2d 1284 (1973).
While stating that it was not necessary to grant a
new trial, this Court stated:
"This seems to be a rather unusual order."
"We think this was highly improper and may
have been prejudicial . . . "
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"The Judge who tried this case has been
retired because of age, and another Judge
will hear any future matters, so that
counsel's fear of bias is of no import."
"If the Decree causes financial distress,
the ruling made can be reviewed if within
one year after final judgment either party
requests it."
"Another possible reason for having the matter looked at within a year is the distribution of the assets."
"The decision of the Court was based upon
an assumption that the net value of the
assets of the plaintiff was $225,000.00
•

• •

11

•

"Having confidence in the integrity of our
trial courts and the ability of the judge
to review the matter if presented to them,
we affirm the judgment rendered and leave
it to the lower court to determine if a
modification should be made."
On the 25th day of October, 1973, the Respondent
filed her "Petition for Review of Economic Matters and Modification of the Decree With Respect Thereto" (R 204).

On

November 12, 1973, the Respondent, in support of her Petition,
filed an "Affidavit" (R 213), and a further "Affidavit and
Proffer of Proof and Motion" (R 247).

Based thereon, the

trial court on the 12th day of November, 1973, issued its
"Order to Show Cause" (R 220), and after a hearing on the
"Order to Show Cause", the trial court on the 7th day of
December, 1973, made and entered its "Order Relating to Review
of Economic Matters and Modification of the Judgment and Decree
With Reference Thereto" (R 233).
The Order of December 7, 1973, provided for further
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discovery and granted to the parties a further hearing with
unrestricted opportunity to present to the Court evidence
bearing upon all economic matters arising from the marriage,
"so that there may be presented to the court full and complete evidence concerning these matters" (R 234) . In its
Order of December 7, 1973, the trial court stated:
"The Court has noted the language contained
in the decision of the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah with reference to this matter.
While the Court notes that there is in the
original Judgment and Decree of Divorce,
the Amended Judgment and Decree of Divorce
and the Decision of the Supreme Court of
the State of Utah, reference to 'serious
financial distress1, it is the conclusion
of this Court that 'serious financial distress ' is a relative matter and the Court
cannot adequately respond to the Petition
of the defendant and herein grant or deny
the ultimate relief prayed for without completely reviewing all of the economic matters resulting from the marital relationship. Furthermore, the Court has noted the
reference in the Supreme Court Decision of
the possibility of prejudice by the trial
court originally trying this matter, and
the further statement of the Supreme Court
that 'Another possible reason for having
the matter looked at within a year is the
distribution of the assets'. Again, it is
the conclusion of this Court that this
Court cannot adequately respond to the
Petition of the defendant and grant or deny
further relief to the defendant without
completely reviewing all of the economic
matters resulting from the marital relationship." (R 236).
Following the Order of December 7, there was extensive discovery and a hearing which commenced on July 23, 1974
and which continued through July 25, 26, 29 and 30, at which
time both parties rested.
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At the direction of the trial court, both parties
thereafter submitted their memorandums and proposals with
respect to a division of the properties (R 334 through 356
and R 357 through 374).

Thereafter, and again at the dir-

ection of the trial court, the parties submitted reply memorandums (R 306 through 318 and R 319 through 333).
After the Memorandums and the Reply Memorandums had
been filed and after arguments with respect thereto, the
trial court on November 11, 1974, made and entered extensive
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R 377) and its Judgment (R 398).
After the entry of the Judgment on November 11, 1974,
the Appellant filed various motions which came on for hearing
commencing December 6, 1974, and continued through December 9,
1974.

During the Noon recess on December 9, 1974, the par-

ties reached a settlement and after the Noon recess, the settlement was read into the record, agreed to by the parties
and their counsel, and approved by the Court.

(See the trans-

cript of December 9 and December 18, 1974, pages 2 through
13) .
After the Stipulation was entered into in open
Court with counsel and parties present, and thereupon approved
by the Court, counsel entered into a written Stipulation
(R 431), and counsel for both parties further executed a
motion moving the Court to enter its Judgment based on the
Stipulation. (R 438).

On December 12, 1974, counsel for both

parties "accepted, approved and agreed as to form and content"
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(R 450) that certain Judgment which was made and entered by
the Court on December 18, 1974 (R 443).
Prior to the entry of the Judgment on December 18,
1974, the Appellant attempted to rescind the Stipulation
(R 440).

The trial court denied the motion to rescind

(R 441), and on December 18, 1974, made and entered the
Judgment which is the only judgment from which the Appellant
appeals (R 552).
The Appellant filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment
of December 18, 1974 (R 536) and a lengthy Memorandum in support thereof (R 501).

After a hearing on the Motion, the

trial court on January 28, 1975, made and entered its Order
denying the Motion and setting forth its reasons therefor
(R 547).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Appellant seeks to have the consent judgment
set aside, to have the Court make an equitable modification
of the original Divorce Decree, or to remand the case back
to the trial court with further instructions.

The Appellant

also seeks a new trial. The Respondent resists the relief
sought by the Appellant, and submits that this matter has
finally been carefully and equitably adjudicated by the trial
court, and that the parties thereafter entered into a Stipulation and a Judgment was based thereon which conclusively settled all of the issues between the parties, and that the
case is now res judicata and non-appealable.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
It is undisputed that the Appellant and Respondent
were married on the 8th day of May, 1953, and that three sons
were delivered Ceasarian section as issue of the marriage
(T 1377).

The trial court fixed custody in the Respondent,

and also fixed the alimony at $300.00 per month, and child
support at $100.00 per month per child.

There is no dispute

or contention with reference to these matters.
At the time of the marriage, the Appellant's only
assets consisted of two automobiles and a small bank account
(T 1377), perhaps $1,500.00 (T 1046).

The Respondent had

some furniture, an automobile and perhaps $500.00 to $1,000.00
(T 1036, 1377).
Appellant is educated, intelligent and articulate,
and regards himself as "academic" (T 572), and places his
friends in a "semi-educated" level (T 573). Respondent has
a high school education and one year of business college
obtained over a number of years at night school.

She has

spent her married years - from age 29 to age 50 - as a housewife and mother (T 1379).

She is now 52 years old.

She has

attempted to do secretarial work, but couldn't because of a
back problem (T 1379).

She has recently attempted to sell

real estate (T 1379).

She is not in good health and is in

need of surgery (T 1380, 1390).
During the marriage, the parties lived in rather
stylish fashion: a $100,000.00 home and a membership at Willow

-6-
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Creek; a twin-engine plane and several trips a year to Palm
Springs, Las Vegas, Aspen and California; entertaining and
eating out; Lincoln Continentals; two or three trips a year
to California, Phoenix, Catalina (T 1381, 1382 and 1493),
and the Appellant enjoyed the luxury of gambling losses
(T 1492).
In 1971, the Appellant left the marital home and
children and refused to maintain a marital relationship with
the Respondent.

He had, on occasion, been violent toward the

Respondent, had physically abused and struck her, had kept
company with other women and had been unfaithful to the Respondent (R 164).

Since the divorce, the Appellant has remarried,

but the Respondent has not (T 1378).

At the time of the

trial in July, 1974, the two younger sons (age 18 and 14),
were at home with the Respondent.

The eldest child was on

a mission in Argentina (T 1378).
Since the divorce, the Respondent has lived poorly.
She can't afford to take vacations; she can no longer entertain; she can no longer drive a Lincoln.

She and the child-

ren cannot afford to go to shows together as a family
(T 1382, 1383).

She has attempted to supplement her income

and works many hours a day and holds open houses on listed
properties on Saturdays and Sundays (T 1383).

She has spent

many hours at the job, but has earned very little money
(T 1384).

The family situation has become chaotic because

of her attempt to supplement her income and meet the demands
of trying to sell real estate (T 1384, 1385).
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She has not

had sufficient funds with which to maintain the residence the carpets are threadbare and there are plumbing problems
(T 1385 and Ex. 35-D).

She has continued to reside in the

$100,000.00 home awarded to her at Willow Creek because of
emotional involvement with the home, and because it is the
home of the children.
new neighborhood.

She has resisted changing them to a

The friends of the children live in the

area, and the children make use of the Willow Creek facility
(T 1385, 1386).

From the time of the original trial in 1972

to the time of the further hearing in 1974, she had fallen
behind in payment of her obligations and had substantial
unpaid bills that were due and owing (Ex. 35-D).
In summary, then, we have a couple who married in
1953, with neither party bringing any substantial assets to
the marriage.

The Respondent was, at the time of the marriage,

29 years .of age.

She has spent her married life principally

as a housewife and mother.

She is not in good health; she

has no special training or talent to provide for her future
years.

She is now over 50 years of age and her opportunities

are limited and restricted.

On the other hand, the Appellant,

who is approximately the same age, is intelligent, educated
and articulate.

He apparently enjoys good health.

He pre-

cipitated or contributed greatly to the divorce, and he is
remarried.
The dispute in this case relates to the division
of properties accumulated during the marriage.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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There is

little or no disagreement as to what those properties are,
but there is substantial disagreement as to their values.
In the original trial, presided over by Judge Faux, Amended
Findings of Fact were made and entered on November 22, 1972,
fixing total assets at $291,890.00, less liabilities of
$66,800.00, for a net worth of $225,000.00 (R 166, 167)/
The trial court attempted to award one-half of these values
to the Respondent by giving her the residence at a value of
$103,000.00, a Chevrolet automobile and proceeds from the
sale of four lots with a value approximated at that time of
$6,000.00 (R 160, 161).
By contrast, the trial court, Judge Taylor, after
an extensive trial and testimony from expert witnesses and
extensive briefing and arguments by counsel, found that the
total assets accumulated during the marriage had a fair market value of $2,037,535.63, and that the total liabilities
were $288,725.65, and that the resulting net worth was, then,
the assets less the liabilities, or $1,748,809.98 (R 379, 380).
The trial court then made a division of these properties with a value of the total assets to be awarded to the
Respondent of $84 2,144.00 and requiring her to discharge
obligations in the amount of $98,856.65, for a net distribution to the Respondent of $743,287.35 (R 406, 407 and 408).
The Court awarded to the Appellant properties with
a value of $1,121,471.63, and required the Appellant to discharge obligations in the amount of $189,869.00, leaving to

-9-
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the Appellant properties, then, with a net value of
$931,602.63 (R 407, 408).
For a detailed analysis of the properties of the
marital estate and the values with reference thereto, the
Court's attention is directed to Memorandum and Proposal
of the defendant and Exhibits thereto (R 334 through 356).
The trial court, in its Findings of Fact made and
entered on November 11, 1974, specifically found:
"The inadequacy and inaccuracy of the original and amended Findings, Conclusions and
Decree, resulted from either the unknowing
and unconscious prejudice of the initial
judge who tried this matter, or as a result
of his misunderstanding of the facts. The
error of the trial court who tried this case
in the first instance was in failing to properly describe, define and itemize substantial portions of the property accumulated
during the marriage, and to assign values
with respect to said properties, and to
include said values in a determination of
the net marital estate. As a result of
the inadequacy and inaccuracy of the original and amended Findings, Conclusions and
Decree, the defendant MARY AVALON KLEIN has
been and will continue to suffer unwarranted,
unconscionable and unnecessary financial
distress, unless said Findings, Conclusions
and Decree are amended to provide for an
equitable and reasonable property division
as herein set out." (R 387).
The description and evaluation of the assets is
complex.
als.

Values of much of the property depended upon apprais-

While there was difference of opinion between the var-

ious appraisers, the values determined by Judge Taylor are
amply supported by the evidence.

The Appellant, in his Brief,

makes no contention that the Findings with respect to the prop-
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erties and values are unsupported by the evidence.
The assets which were evaluated by Judge Taylor
were the same assets that were considered in the previous
trial by Judge Faux.

It does not appear from the Appellant's

Brief that the Appellant makes any contention to the contrary. ••:•'•Following the original Taylor Judgment of November
11, 1974/ the parties entered into the Stipulation with reference to the modification thereof (R 431), and made their
motion moving the Court for a Judgment, Decree and Order
amending the Taylor Judgment of November 11, 1974 (R 438).
Based on the Stipulations and the motion, the trial court,
Judge Taylor, on December 18, 1974, made and entered its
Judgment, Decree and Order Amending and Modifying the Court's
Judgment of November 11, 1974 (R 443). The stipulated Modification of the Judgment was based upon an offer made by the
Respondent which the Appellant accepted.

(See the trans-

cript of December 9 and December 18, 1974, pages 2 through
13).

The effect of the offer made by the Respondent and

the acceptance thereof by the Appellant and the modification
of the Judgment based thereon was to reduce the properties
being awarded to the Respondent in the approximate amount of
$200,000.00, and to increase the values of the properties
being awarded to the Appellant in the approximate amount of
$200,000.00.
As the matter now stands, then, the net value of
the properties being awarded to the Respondent after the disDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

charge of certain obligations, is $543,287.35,

The net value

of the properties being awarded to the Appellant after the
discharge of certain obligations, is $1,131,602.63.

POINT I
THE JUDGMENT OF DECEMBER 18, 1974 IS
A VALID AND BINDING JUDGMENT BASED ON
THE COURT APPROVED ORAL AND WRITTEN
STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES. ALL MATTERS IN CONTROVERSY HAVE BEEN SETTLED
AND THE CASE IS RES JUDICATA AND NOT
SUBJECT TO APPEAL.
Before addressing the question as to the validity
of the Judgment of December 18, 1974, it is to be noted
that there is a prior Judgment dated November 11, 1974
(R 398).

There has been no appeal from the prior Judgment.

The Notice of Appeal does not specify any appeal from the
prior Judgment (R 552).

It is submitted that if the Court

should grant the relief asked by the Appellant to have the
consent Judgment of December 18, 1974 set aside, then the
Judgment of November 11, 1974 will become the extant Judgment
which will fix the rights of the parties.
tory to the Respondent.

This is satisfac-

If this Court agrees and concludes

that the Judgment of November 11, 1974 would become the effective extant Judgment upon setting aside the Judgment of
December 18, 1974, then the Respondent concurs therewith,
and agrees thereto, and this Court may dispose of this case
without further attention by granting the relief sought in
plaintiff's appeal, and declaring that upon doing so the Judgment of November 11, 1974 will be and is the effective
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

extant Judgment.
The Appellant does not make any contention that
the Judgment from which he appeals is contrary to or inconsistent with the terms of the Stipulation he entered into
in open Court (which was approved by the Court), nor the
written Stipulation that was thereafter signed by his counsel.

The Judgment was approved by his counsel, both as to

form and content (R 450).

Rather, the Appellant contends

that he simply didn't understand the Stipulation.

In this

respect, it should be noted that the Appellant is an educated
man over fifty years of age.

He has had sufficient intelli-

gence and acumen to accumulate an estate of approximately Two
Million Dollars in the past twenty years.

He was represented

by the same counsel from the commencement of the divorce
action in October, 1971, through the date of the Stipulation,
December 9, 1974, and the entry of the Judgment based thereon.
He was present at proceedings on many occasions, specifically
including April 11, 12, 13, 14 and" 17, 1972, the 3rd day of
Decmeber, 1973, July 23, 25, 26, 29 and 30, 1974, and December
6 and 9, 1974, and many other dates when various matters were
argued to the Court.

During the marriage and the accumulation

of the assets, he was responsible therefor, and on December 9,
1974 he enjoyed a peculiar and special knowledge concerning
the assets, the ownerships, the values, and the many intricacies concerning the properties and the divorce action.

With

that background, understanding and knowledge, he was present

-13-
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in the Courtroom on December 6 when his motions were being
argued, and again on the morning of December 9.

During a

recess on the morning of December 9, counsel for Respondent
made a further offer of settlement to counsel for Appellant.
Those details were discussed between the Appellant and his
counsel during the two-hour Noon recess, and at the commencement of proceedings at 2:00 on the afternoon of December 9,
counsel for the Appellant advised Respondents counsel and
the Court that they had accepted Respondent's offer of settlement.

(See page 2 of the transcript of December 9, 1974).

It should be noted that the offer made by the Respondent which
was accepted by the Appellant, was a further concession by
the Respondent which decreased the net values of piroperties
being awarded to her by approximately $200,000.00, and increased
the values being awarded to the Appellant by the Scime amount.
The Respondent made this concession to attempt to put an
end to the protracted, bitter, emotionally distressing, timeconsuming and expensive litigation.
The Appellant in his Brief attempts to persuade
the Court that the transcript of the Stipulation itself
demonstrates that the Appellant did not understand..

He

cites four lines from that transcript as evidence that the
Appellant did not understand.
out of context.

Those four lines are taken

The questions and answers with respect thereto

related to only one specific matter.

Following that exchange,

the Appellant had an opportunity to consult with his counsel
and then, at the conclusion of the rather lengthy Stipulation
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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read into the record by counsel, Mr. Klein stated:
"By way of the record, I accept the stipulation and I so understand. Spoken by
Robert D. Klein."
(The Courtfs attention is directed to pages 2 through 13 of
the transcript of the hearing held on the 9th day of December,
1974, and for the above-referenced quote, the Court's attention is directed to the bottom of page 11 thereof).
The references in Appellant's Brief to his lack of
understanding, his shock, his disorientation, his mental
fatigue at the time of the Stipulation, are self-serving,
unsubstantiated and unsupported delcarations that are not
entitled to credibility.

The trial court was present and

observed the conduct and demeanor of the Appellant, and could
not thereafter be persuaded that Appellant did not know what
he was about.
It is beyond comprehension and defies logic for
anyone to believe or acknowledge that the Appellant under the
circumstances did not fully understand what he was doing.

A

more rational explanation of the Appellant's conduct is that
he has attempted from the beginning, through a war of attrition,
to starve the Respondent into submission.

At the hearing on

his motions on December 6 and again on December 9, he finally
won another concession from the Respondent, and that is, she
acquiesced in a further division of the property that decreased
her values by approximately $200,000.00, and increased his by
the same amount.

Having accomplished that task, the Appellant

then sought to rescind his agreement, change counsel, and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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start negotiating further under a threat of further appeal,
further bitterness, further emotional distress, further
poverty, and further legal expenses for the Respondent.
The legion of authorities cited by the Appellant
in Point I of his Brief constitute a smokescreen to obfuscate
what the law really is. The law in this jurisdiction is well
settled and has been stated in the case of Johnson, et ux v.
Peoples Finance & Thrift Company, et al, 2 Utah 2d 246, 272
P.2d 171 (July, 1954).

In that case, the parties entered

into a stipulation and thereafter failed to perform.

The

plaintiffs moved the Court to set aside the stipulation based
upon the ground that the stipulation was entered into
"Improvidently, inadvertently and mistakenly,
and that said stipulation was entered into
under a mistake of fact which, if enforced,
will amount to constructive fraud against
the plaintiffs."
Thereafter, and notwithstanding plaintiffs1 motion, the trial
court entered a judgment based upon the stipulation.

An appeal

was taken from that judgment, and this Court said:
"It would indeed be a serious reflection
upon our system of jurisprudence if parties
could stipulate an agreement of settlement,
but refuse with impunity from performing.
Courts are not impotent when one or more
parties to a stipulation becomes recalcitrant . . . We think the trial court took
the proper course when he entered judgment
embodying the terms of the stipulation . . .
Judgments of courts are presumed to be correct
if nothing in the record appears to the contrary . . . The trial court considered
plaintiffs1 objections and found them wanting in bases. In view of the state of the
record, we must assume the judgment is supported by the stipulation."
-16-
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Again, this Court, in the case of Bean v. Carlos,
reported in 21 Utah 2d 309, 445 P.2d 144 (September, 1968),
directly addressed the question that is raised in this case
on almost similar facts. After trial had commenced and evidence had been taken, the parties advised the court that they
had agreed upon a settlement.
were stated for the record.

The terms of the settlement

The court queried:

"The parties, several of the parties are
present. You all understand that to be
the stipulation and the agreement for
settlement?"
Subsequently, a written stipulation was submitted to one of
the parties, who refused to sign.

A motion was filed for

entry of judgment in accordance with the stipulation made in
open court.

The trial court made and entered the judgment

based on those stipulations.

An appeal was taken therefrom,

and this Court cited with approval and quoted from Johnson
v. Peoples Finance & Thrift Company, supra, and affirmed the
action of the trial court in entering the judgment.
The legal treatises also support this view:
"A judgment by consent is entitled to the
same presumptions as any other judgment
rendered in the ordinary course of procedure. When made by consent, it is presumed
that the judgment is made in view of the
existing facts and circumstances of the
litigation, and that these facts are within
the knowledge of the parties." (47 Am. Jur.
2d, Judgments, Section 1088).
"In the absence of fraud, mistake, or collusion, a judgment by consent is binding and
conclusive upon the parties and those in
privity with them, to the same extent as
judgments rendered upon controverted facts
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and due consideration thereof upon a contested trial. And notwithstanding flat statements to the contrary in some of the cases,
which, however, in their actual holdings
fail to bear out these statements, it is well
settled, as a general proposition, that a judgment or decree, though entered by consent or
agreement of the parties, is res judicata to
the same extent as if entered after contest."
(47 Am. Jur. 2d, Judgments, Section 1089).
In the case of Washington Asphalt Company v. Harold
Kaser Company, 316 P.2d 126 (1957), the Supreme Court of
Washington, with respect to a stipulated consent judgment,
opined as follows:
"We are of the opinion that all issues pending between appellants and respondent . . . were
merged in the stipulation entered into by the
parties at the time of trial.
A judgment by consent or stipulation of the
parties is construed as a contract between
them embodying the terms of the judgment. It
excuses all prior errors and operates to end
all controversies between the parties, within
the scope of the judgment. In the absence of
fraud, mistake, or want of jurisdiction, a
judgment by consent will not be reviewed on
appeal." (Citing numerous cases).
It is respectfully submitted that this entire matter
has been conclusively settled by the stipulation and agreement
of the parties and by the Judgment entered based thereon.

It

is further submitted that by such consent and judgment, the
matter is totally res judicata, and there is no unresolved
issue left from which a party can appeal.

In this respect,

at the hearing on December 9, 1974, where the Stipulation was
entered into, the following colloquy took place between the
Court, counsel and parties:

-18-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"MR. COWLEY: Your Honor, I'd like to
suggest one more thing that needs to be
discussed in front of these people. Make
sure they understand this, too. By entering into this stipulation and settling it
on this basis, neither party has any further appeal rights left in this matter.
It's closed.
THE COURT: That's true. It is a correct
statement in law. There is no error if
the parties willingly and I suppose there
might be a little technicality. Maybe I
ought to put them under oath, although they
have been under oath for four or five days
in the prior proceeding.
MR. COWLEY: I want to know — make sure
both know they have no further appeal rights,
and this concludes the matter forever.
MR. KLEIN: By way of the record, I accept
the stipulation and I so understand. Spoken
by Robert D. Klein.
THE COURT:
Mrs. Klein?
MRS. KLEIN:

Do you understand the same,
Yes, I do.

THE COURT: Well, that's nice. Now, we've
finally got it completed. Who is going to
prepare it?"
(See transcript of December 9 and 18, 1974, pages 11 and 12).
Since the matter was finally and conclusively settled by the agreement of the parties, with the approval of
the Court, the entire matter is now res judicata, and this
appeal should be dismissed.
The Respondent moves the Court for an Order of
Dismissal.
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POINT II
THE JUDGMENT OF NOVEMBER 11,
AS BETWEEN THE PARTIES, AND
THERETO OF DECEMBER 18, 1974
FICATION MORE FAVORABLE TO

1974 WAS EQUITABLE
THE MODIFICATION
RENDERED THE MODITHE APPELLANT.

If this Court concludes that the matters set forth
in Point I of the Respondent's Brief are not dispositive,
then the Court must look to the equities.
In such event, the Respondent does not disagree
with the law cited by the Appellant to the effect that the
parties are entitled to the Judgment of the Supreme* Court
as well as that of the trial court.

The Respondent acknow-

ledges that if this matter is properly before this Court, then
the Court has the right to review the matter and make its own
determinations with respect to the division of the property.
The Court also has the alternative right to remand the matter
for further proceedings with or without directions to the trial
court*
Assuming, but not acknowledging, that this Court

•

may not find the matters set forth in Point I above* dispositive,
it becomes necessary to examine the law and the facts to
determine if the division of the property was proper and
equitable.
Section 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended,
(1973 Supp.) sets forth the basic standard with respect to
the division of property:
"When a decree of divorce is made, the court
may make such orders in relation to the children,
property and parties, and the maintenances of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the parties and children, as may be equitable.
The court shall have continuing jurisdiction
to make such subsequent changes or new orders
with respect to the support and maintenance
of the parties, the custody of the children
and their support and maintenance, or the
distribution of the property as shall be
reasonably necessary."
The Utah Supreme Court has, on many occasions,
attempted to provide a more definitive criteria by which the
appropriateness of a property distribution could be judged.
In 1898, this Court suggested that the wife should have an
award of one-third of the property.

Griffin v. Griffin, 18

Utah 98, 55 P.84 (1898).
By 1926, this Court provided in a case that the
wife should receive at least one-half of her husband's property.

Stewart v. Stewart,

66 Utah 366, 242 P.947 (1926).

In 1930, this Court reversed the trial court's
decision in which the lower court had awarded the wife approximately a one-third interest.

This Court said that under the

circumstances, the wife was entitled to an award of 50% of the
marital estate.

Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, 292 P.214

(1930).
In 1937, a trial court awarded the wife two-thirds
of the property.

On appeal, the Supreme Court modified the

trial court's decision and reduced the wife's share to 50%.
In doing so, the Court outlined nine specific factors to be
considered in making a division of the property.

Pinion v.

Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P.2d 265 (1937).
In endeavoring to apply the nine factors in subseDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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quent cases, the Court continued to find a 50% distribution
to the wife appropriate where the marriage had lasted over
a long period of time and the property had been substantially
acquired during the marriage.

Johnson v. Johnson, 107 Utah

147, 152 P.2d 426 (1944).
In 1949, the Court upheld an award of 80% to the
wife as equitable and fair,

Tremayne v. Tremayne, 116 Utah

483, 211 P.2d 452 (1949).
In 1951, this Court attempted to redefine and
expand the criteria set forth in Pinion.

The Court divided

the factors to be considered into those existent at the time
of the marriage and those existent at the time of the divorce.
There were six factors in the former category and nine in the
latter category.

MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 Utah 573, 236

P.2d 1066 (1951).
Finally, in Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d
977 (1956), Mr. Justice Crockett, speaking for the Court, summarized in a substantially shortened and more concise form
the criteria to be considered in making division of property:
"The courtfs responsibility is to endeavor
to provide a just and equitable adjustment
of their economic resources so that the parties can reconstruct their lives on a happy
and useful basis. In doing so it is necessary for the court to consider, in addition
to the relative guilt or innocence of the
parties, an appraisal of all the attendant
facts and circumstances: the duration of the
marriage; the ages of the parties; their
social positions and standards of living;
their health; considerations relative to
children; the money and property they possess and how it was acquired; their capacities and training and their present and potential incomes."
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When the marriage is of long duration, the property in dispute was acquired during the course of the marriage, and the wife's earning capacity is limited considerably, an equal distribution of the property means at least
a 50% distribution to the wife.

Where those factors exist

and the lower court awards the wife at least 50% of the
marital estate, the trial court decision will not be disturbed on appeal.

Slaughter v. Slaughter, 18 Utah 2d 274,

421 P.2d 503 (1966); Johnson v. Johnson, supra, Tremayne v.
Tremayne, supra.
Where the trial court failed to award the wife at
least 50% of the marital estate under circumstances such as
exist in this case, the trial court's decision was modified
on appeal.

Stewart v. Stewart, supra; Dahlberg v. Dahlberg,

supra.
The parties to this action were married in 1953
and they separated in the Fall of 1971 and were divorced in
1972.

The Respondent's earning capacity is much less than

that of the Appellant.

She has occupied her time as a house-

wife and mother, while the Appellant has continued to enjoy
substantial professional, economic and financial growth.
As the matter now stands, the Judgment of December 18,
1974 awards to the Respondent properties with a net value of
$543,287.35, and to the Appellant properties with a net value
of $1,131,620.63.

Again, it should be repeated that the Appel-

lant does not contend that the values are unsupported by the

-23-
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evidence.

Furthermore, the values are net after allowance

for all debts.
Essentially, there is a division with one-third of
the net assets being awarded to the wife and two-thirds being
awarded to the husband.

Under the existing circumstances

where the property was acquired during the marriage over a
twenty-year period, the division is more than fair to the
Appellant.

Considering the state of the law and the facts in

this case, it is incomprehensible and indeed, offensive, for
the Appellant to suggest that he has been treated inequitably
and unfairly.
It has to be assumed that this Court will not find
that the Judgment of November 11, 1974, as modified by the
stipulated Judgment of December 18, 1974, is inequitable as
to the Appellant.
The other contention asserted by the Appellant is
that the division will cause a collapse of the marital estate.
This assertion is so patently absurd and the piecemeal selection of isolated facts in Appellant's Brief are so out of context that a line-by-line response thereto is, within the time
and space available, essentially impossible.

It is felt neces-

sary, however, to attempt to place the matter in perspective.
First, the only new burden imposed upon the Appellant by the Judgment of November 11 and December 18, 1974,
insofar as cash is required, is the obligation to pay Respondent $50/000.00 without interest over a ten-year period.

This

was agreed to by the Appellant in the Stipulation of December 9,
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1974, and was done so because he received offsetting benefits improving his net position by the sum of approximately
$200,000-00.

If the Appellant cannot pay the $50,000.00

out of earnings, then the Appellant can certainly liquidate
a very small portion of the large and diverse properties
awarded to him.

This being the only new burden agreed to and

imposed upon the Appellant, it is difficult to imagine that
this will cause the collapse of the Appellant's million dollar
empire.

All of the other obligations of the Appellant (prin-

cipally to pay indebtednesses upon properties) were already
extant.
Secondly, contrary to assertions by the Appellant,
the parties aire not left engaged in common ownership or joint
affairs.

The Judgments were carefully drafted by the Court

to prevent such a situation.

In this respect, we call to

this Court's attention the results of the Judgment:
A.

The parties are not left with joint ownership of any property.

B.

The Appellant is left with full ownership
of all stocks in all the corporations.

C.

With respect to the Seegmiller property in
St. George (approximately 1200 acres),
there is to be a physical division thereof,
with 600 acres to each party.

There was a

$75,000.00 mortgage on the Seegmiller property that was due and owing at time of trial.
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The Judgment requires the Appellant to
discharge the property being awarded to the
Respondent from the lien of that mortgage
within three years*

The obligation of the

Appellant to discharge this obligation was
agreed to be secured by a pledge of the Major
Enterprises stock.
With respect to the Pershing Nelson-Wanda
Sandberg property in St. George, the Appellant sold the property on a contract for
the sum of $504,000.00 to a corporation of
which the Appellant owns 82-1/2% of the stock.
The contract is left unmodified by the Judgments , and all of the stock is awarded to the
Appellant.

The Judgment provides for a lien

in favor of Respondent upon the contract
receivable of the Appellant, and the land
represented thereby, in favor of the Respondent, in the amount of $252,000.00, payable
to the Respondent at the rate of $600.00 per
acre without interest, only as the land is
sold or used by the Appellant.

The market value

of Appellant's interest in this 420 acres
and the corporate stock was determined to be
$700,762.50 (R 382).
There are fourteen finished apartments in
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St. George, together with 3.1 acres of contiguous unimproved acreage.

The Judgment

awards the improved apartments to the Respondent, subject to the mortgage thereon, which
she is required to pay.

The Judgment awards

the unimproved land to the Appellant, so that
he may sell or develop the same as he chooses.
F.

In light of the substantial concessions made
by the Respondent at the time of the Stipulation and as partial consideration therefor,
the Appellant agreed to pay her the sum of
$50,000.00, at the rate of $5,000.00 per year
without interest.

To guarantee to the Respon-

dent that this would be paid, the Appellant's
stock in Major Enterprises was agreed to be
pledged as security therefor.
It is also necessary to comment upon solid assets
versus speculative assets.

The assets with respect to which

there is little question as to value and which cannot be considered as speculative were divided between the parties as
follows:

(R 398, 443)
TO APPELLANT:
A.

All of the stock in Major Enterprises and the other corporations,
with net values in excess of:

B.

The Appellant's profit sharing
funds in Major Enterprises, with
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$800,000.00

a value of:
C.

$ 47,850.00

The 3.1 acres of unimproved ground
in downtown St. George, with a
value of:

$ 60,000.00

TOTAL NON-SPECULATIVE PROPERTIES
AWARDED TO APPELLANT:

$907,850.00

TO RESPONDENT:
D.

The family residence in Salt Lake
City, with a value of:

E.

$103,000.00

Stock in Intermountain Land &
Development Corporation (liquidated by Respondent):

$

F.

Receivable from Appellant:

$ 50,000.00

G.

The fourteen apartments in St.

7,000.00

George, with a net value of:

$ 33,000.00

TOTAL NON-SPECULATIVE PROPERTIES
AWARDED TO RESPONDENT:

$193,000.00

AWARD OF SPECULATIVE PROPERTIES:
TO APPELLANT:
A.

Holidair Lands stock and contract
receivable on Sandberg and Nelson
properties, less $252,000.00 con-

B.

tingent payable to Respondent:

$448,762.50

600 acres of Seegmiller land:

$208,000.00

TOTAL SPECULATIVE TO APPELLANT:

-28Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

$656,7 62.50

TOTAL SPECULATIVE TO RESPONDENT:
A.

Contingent Holidair Land contract

$252,000.00

B.

600 acres of Seegmiller property:

$208,000.00

TOTAL SPECULATIVE TO RESPONDENT:

$460/000,00 1/

It is obvious from the foregoing analysis that the
trial court considered the quality of the properties and awarded both some speculative and non-speculative assets to each
party.

If there is a failure with respect to any of the spec-

ulative assets, both parties lose.

If there is a loss on the

Nelson-Sandberg properties, both parties lose.

Since the

Respondent's interest is fixed at $252,000.00, if there is a
gain over current values, only the Appellant gets the benefit
thereof.

If there is a gain or loss on the Seegmiller prop-

erty, both parties will be affected thereby*
The trial court could have avoided all of the problems

of this evaluation and the quality of the various prop-

erties by just awarding to each of the parties proportionate
shares of stock in the corporations and undivided interests
in the land and contracts receivable.

Rather than adopt the

easy course, the trial court has wisely attempted to sever
the relationship between the parties and their joint interest in properties.

Considering the many complexities, the

trial court has excelled in structuring a judgment that will
1/

All of the values referred to throughout this Brief are
set forth in the defendant's Memorandum commencing on
page 334 of the Record and continuing through page 356.
The evaluations are further set forth in the Courtfs Findings of Fact commencing at page 377 of the Record and continuing
page
397.
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permit the parties to go on their independent ways.

Further-

more, if there is some error in the evaluation because of the
division made by the Court, both parties will be appropriately
affected thereby.
At the commencement of the hearing in July of 1974,
the parties stipulated that there need be no change with reference to alimony or child support or a number of other miscellaneous items.

The Respondent does not seek further alimony.

She does not wish to continue indefinitely to be that dependent upon the Appellant.

What the Respondent desires and

what she is properly entitled to is a fair share of the assets
that were acquired by the mutual efforts of the parties during the marriage.
The record conclusively demonstrates thcit the Respondent has not had awarded to her any more than a fciir share of
the assets.

The award to Appellant of approximately two-thirds

of the net assets is more than fair and equitable.
Because of the foregoing, it is submitted that there
has been no inequity or unfairness to the Appellant, and this
Court need not either modify the Decree or remand the matter
to the trial court for further proceedings.

POINT III

•

THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO PROCEED
WITH A FURTHER HEARING AND TO MODIFY THE
JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE DIVISION OF THE
MARITAL ESTATE.
Secion 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended,
provides as follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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" . . . The court shall have continuing
jurisdiction to make such subsequent
changes or new orders with respect to
the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the children and
their support and maintenance, or the
distribution of the property as shall be
reasonable and necessary."
The above quoted statute contains in clear and
unambiguous language a legislative grant of jurisdiction to
the Court to make such subsequent changes or new orders with
respect to the distribution of the property as shall be
"reasonable and necessary".
The Decree of Judge Faux of November 22, 1973 contained a specific reservation of jurisdiction.
This Court, in its Decision with respect to the
Appeal from the Faux Decree, reported in Klein v. Klein, 30
Utah 2d 1, 511 P.2d 1284 (1973), used the following language:
"This seems to be a rather unusual order."
"We think this was highly improper and may
have been prejudicial."
"The Judge who tried this case has been
retired because of age, and another Judge
will hear any future matters, so that
counsel's fear of bias is of no import."
"If the Decree causes financial distress,
the ruling made can be reviewed if within
one year after final judgment either party
requests it."
"Another possible reason for having the
matter looked at within a year is the distribution of the assets."
"The decision of the Court was based upon an
assumption that the net value of the assets
of the plaintiff was $225,000.00 . . . "
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"Having confidence in the integrity of our
trial courts and the ability of the judge
to review the matter if presented to them,
we affirm the judgment rendered and leave
it to the lower court to determine if a modification should be made.11
It is obvious from the above quoted language that
this Court acknowledged the possibility of improprieties in
the Faux Decree, and recognized that the trial court did
have the right upon the application of either party to look
at the* "distribution of the assets".
The trial court, Judge Sawaya, made reference to
the language in the Supreme Court decision and concluded
that he had a duty to conduct further proceedings with respect to economic matters (R 233 through 236).
A domestic relation proceeding and division of the
"marital estate" is essentially a proceeding in equity.
"A measure of discretion is exercised by
a court of equity in determining whether
it will take jurisdiction of a case. Likewise, a court of equity is generally permitted to exercise discretion in determining
whether or not, on the facts presented at
the trial, relief should be granted, and if
so, the extent of the relief. Ordinarily,
the propriety of affording equitable relief
in a particular case rests in the sound
discretion of the court, to be exercised
according to the circumstances and exigencies of the case . . . Judicial discretion
to grant relief becomes a judicial duty to
grant it under some circumstances, and the
grace which equity should bestow then becomes
a matter of right."
" . . . Equity looks at the whole situation
and grants or withholds relief as good conscience dictates, and a court of equity is
bound to look into all the facts and circumstances and determine what is fair, just and
equitable . . . "
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"The power of equity is said to be coextensive with the right to relief; it is as broad
as equity and justice require. In the administration of remedies, an equity court is not
bound by the strict or rigid rules of the
common law, on the contrary, the court adapts
its relief and molds its decrees to satisfy
the requirements of the case and to protect
and conserve the equities of the parties litigant. The court has such plenary power, since
its purpose is the accomplishment of justice
amid all of the vicissitudes and intricacies
of life. It is said that equity has always
preserved the elements of flexibility and
expansiveness so that new remedies may be
invented or old ones modified in order to
meet the requirements of every case and to
satisfy the needs of a progressive social
condition. In other words, the plastic
remedies of equity are molded to the needs
of justice and are employed to protect the
equities of all parties, and the flexibility
of equitable jurisdiction permits innovation
in remedies to meet all varieties of circumstances which may arise in any case. Moreover, the fact that there is no precedent
for the precise relief sought is of no consequence . . . "
(27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity,
§§ 102-103).
There can be no doubt that the trial court had
jurisdiction with the right and even the obligation to conduct
further proceedings in this matter.

The trial court did so,

and the wisdom thereof is demonstrated by the results.

While

Judge Faux found the marital estate to have a value of approximately $225,000.00, on the further proceedings by Judge Taylor,
and considering the same properties, the values were found to
be approximately $2,000,000.00. The Faux evaluation was
subject to a claim by the Respondent that Judge Faux was biased
and prejudiced.

No such claim has been made by the Appellant

with respect to the Judge Taylor proceedings.
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It should also be noted that while the Appellant
doesn't like the results and disagrees with the values established by Judge Taylor, he doesn't contend that the findings
with respect to values are unsupported by the evidence.

As

a matter of fact, the evidence amply justifies and supports
the findings by Judge Taylor with respect to properties and
values.
The Respondent further notes that Appellant fails
to cite one authority in support of

his contention that the

trial court was without jurisdiction.
It has to be concluded, then, that the trial court
did have jurisdiction and that Point III of the Appellant is
without merit.

-

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INCLUDED CERTAIN ASSETS
IN THE MARITAL ESTATE
It is acknowledged by the Respondent that the Court
should not necessarily consider assets not accumulated during
the marriage as part of the marital estate.
Contrary, however, to the assertions of the Appellant that the Seegmiller property was acquired after the
divorce action was commenced, the record amply demonstrates
that Robert D. Klein first took an option on the Seegmiller
2/
property on the 31st day of May, 1962 (Ex. 7-D) . -'
2/
~~

The typed copy of this Option Agreement set forth in pages
30-32 of the Appellant's "Abstract" shows the date of May
31, 197 2. Whether intentionally or inadvertently, this is
in error. Observation of Ex. 7-D and page 62 of the record,
which
isthe Howard
a Xerox
ofJ. Reuben
theClark
original,
Digitized by
W. Huntercopy
Law Library,
Law School, BYU.reveals that it was,
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Thus, the option was first acquired some ten years prior to
the divorce through the joint efforts of the parties and
with funds accumulated by the parties.

The funds continued

to be paid and the option continued to be extended for a
period of ten years, and was then finally exercised by the
Appellant.

It is not difficult to understand why the Respon-

dent in 1972, after the Appellant had left the family residence and commenced a divorce action, refused to join the
Appellant in the execution of a further promissory note.

This

does not detract from the fact that the option and the property represented thereby was a valuable property right acquired
some ten years prior to the divorce.
Joint assets were used to acquire the option, to
continue to extend it, and to exercise it.

The Appellant

notes that he has borrowed funds since 1971 with which to
maintain the properties.

The Appellant had the opportunity

at time of trial and, in fact, used the opportunity, to have
the Court consider all of his liabilities in arriving at the
net worth of the marital estate.

The liabilities of the

Appellant were subtracted from the gross assets to arrive at
net values.

Furthermore, while the borrowing of funds to

make a payment on property may create a debt, there is a corresponding and offsetting increase in the equity of the property.
Under the circumstances, the inclusion of the Seegmiller property as a jointly acquired marital asset was
proper.
'. -35- .:'
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POINT V
THE EVALUATION OF THE ASSETS AS OF THE TIME
OF THE MODIFICATION HEARINGS WAS NOT IN ERROR,
AND DID NOT CREATE ANY SUBSTANTIAL OR SIGNIFICANT VARIATIONS IN THE PROPERTIES TO BE AWARDED
TO THE PARTIES.
The Appellant makes some claim that there is some
technical deficiency in the date of the evaluation of the
assets.

There was only a two-year difference in time between

the date of original evaluation in the Faux trial and the
date of evaluation in the Taylor trial.
On page 42 of the first Brief filed by the Appellant, and on page 45 of the second Brief filed by the Appellant, the Appellant concedes that the valuation date was not
of significance when he writes,
"Their value was fully litigated by both
sides, those values have not changed significantly since they were first litigated
and determined at the original trial."
Thus, the Appellant acknowledges that the date of
evaluation was not significant.
Even if the date of evaluation were significant,
can it be said that the Respondent is not entitled to share
in the fluctuating values of the assets acquired during the
marriage pending the final disposition of those assets?

We

think not.
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT'S EVALUATION OF THE MARITAL
ASSETS WERE FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE
AND THE LAW.
The Appellant does not contend that the valuations
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fixed by the trial court are unsupported by the evidence.
Rather, the Appellant merely complains that the values are
grossly inconsistent with those established in the November,
19 72 Judgment. Logic suggests that these inconsistencies
should not comfort the Appellant, but that they justify the
entire modification proceedings and the November 11, 1974
Judgment rendered with respect thereto.
The values fixed by Judge Taylor in 1974 are fully
and amply supported by the evidence.

Calculations with res-

pect to those values and the Court's Findings with respect
thereto are carefully and fully set out in the record (R 334
through 356 and R 377 through 389). The Respondent will not
trifle further with this Court's time by setting forth in
detail all of the material referred to.
The Appellant complains about the treatment of the
Holidair Land contract receivable.

The values with respect

to Holidair Lands, Inc. and the stock owned by the Appellant
and the contract receivable owned by the Appellant are set
out in detail in the Court's Findings of Fact (R 380 through
382).

The values of the land involved with Holidair Lands,

Inc. were determined by the Court to be as follows:
A.

325 acres, at a value of $1,573.00 per
acre, equals $511,000.00.

B.

95 acres, at a value of $3,522.00 per acre,
equals $335,000.00.

The Court granted to the Respondent a $600.00 per acre interest.
The Appellant suggests that the contract receivable
should have been discounted to reflect the diference between
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the contract interest rate and the market interest rate for
contract receivables. The Appellant fails to recognize that
under the Judgment as fashioned by the Court, the Appellant
owes the Respondent nothing with respect to this property
unless and until such time as the Appellant either sells or
uses the property.

At that time, there is due and payable

to the Respondent the sum of $600.00 per acre as the land is
sold or used until the Respondent has received the sum of
$252,000.00.

The obligation is contingent upon the use or

sale of the land by the Appellant and the obligation and the
burden does not carry any interest.

Since the obligation is

not burdened with interest and since the Appellant is not
required to pay the Respondent until he sells or uses the
property, we cannot understand Appellant's contention that
there should be a discount because of an interest factor.
Furthermore, the Appellant may hold this land indefinitely,
subject only to the requirement to pay to the Respondent the
sum of $600.00 per acre when the land is sold or used.

As

the matter is structured, the Appellant will get the full bene
fit of any appreciation, since the Respondent's interest
therein is fixed at an absolute dollar amount.
The Appellant complains about the method used to
determine the value of the Appellant's stock in Major Enterprises.

The simple facts are that 50% of the stock is owned

by one Verl O'Brien and the other 50% of the stock stands in
the name of the Appellant.

This creates an absolute deadlock

situation with respect to the management of the corporation.
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Either party may demand a liquidation of the corporate assets
at any time (§16-10-92, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as Amended).
The continuation of the corporate business in corporate form
is conditioned upon the continuing agreement and acquiescence
of both Mr. O'Brien and the Appellant.

Under these circum-

stances, the corporate stock as such has no market value as
a stock.

Its only value to anyone would be the value in the

event of liquidation, in which event, all assets would be
sold, all obligations would be paid and the balance would be
divided between the parties.

This is the basis upon which

the Court approached the matter and evaluated the assets
held by the corporation, then subtracted therefrom the liabilities, to arrive at the liquidated net worth of the corporation
which was

then divided by two, to determine Appellant's value

in this asset (R 343 through 346 and 379). It is submitted
that there is no other reasonable or equitable way to determine the value of this asset.

Even though Appellant claims

the value of Major is grossly exaggerated, the Respondent has
always been willing to accept the Major Enterprises stock (or
for that matter, any other asset) by way of distribution to
her at the values fixed by the Court.

The Respondent has

offered and does hereby again offer to settle this matter by
having awarded to her only the residence and the stock in
Major Enterprises.

We renew such overture.

We are confident

that Appellant will not accept this offer, but Respondent
would be pleased if he did so.
The Appellant complains of the values given to the
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Seegmiller land.

The fact is, and the Appellant's own Brief

so indicates, that Mr. Gus Johns, a well-known and well-qualified appraiser, made a study and an appraisal of this 1200acre parcel of land and discounted its value because of the
unavailability of water.
worth substantially more.

With water, the land would have been
In any event, the precise evaluation

of this particular land is of little moment, since each of
the parties were awarded one-half thereof.

If the land has

a lesser value than that testified to by Mr. Johns, both parties will be equally affected thereby.
It is submitted that there are no significant or
material errors with respect to the valuation of the marital
assets.
POINT VII
THE RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES WILL NOT BE ADVERSELY
AFFECTED BY THE JUDGMENTS RENDERED IN THIS MATTER.
The Appellant personally acquired the interest in
the Sandberg property under an Option Agreement dated the
21st day of September, 1964 (R 51 and Ex. 6-D). The Appellant
personally acquired his interest in the Nelson property under
an Agreement entered into in 1970 (R 63 and Ex. 32-D).

In

February of 1971, the Appellant then entered into an Agreement
with Holidair Lands, wherein he sold the Nelson and Sandberg
lands to Holidair Lands for the contract sum of $504,000.00.
The contract specifically provides, "The Seller (Appellant)
shall release one acre, to be selected by the Buyer (Holidair
Lands, Inc.) for each $1,200.00 paid by the Buyer to the Seller
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under the terms and conditions of this agreement."

(Ex. 5-D) .

It is clear, then, that Holidair Lands, Inc. and
its shareholders (Appellant and one Rogers), do not acquire
any title and interest in and to the lands except only from
the Appellant, and only at such times as Holidair Lands pays
to Appellant the sum of $1,200.00 per acre.

The effect of

this, then, is that the rights of Holidair Lands in and to the
acres is not in any way jeopardized, since it has an absolute
right to receive the same upon payment of the $1,200.00 per
acre.

At such time as Holidair Lands pays to Appellant the

$1,200.00 per acre, the Appellant must pay to the Respondent
the sum of $600.00, and upon doing so, Respondent's lien with
respect to the acreage is satisfied and discharged.

Contrary

to assertions by the Appellant, the property division was
structured in such a fashion that the rights of the Respondent
to $600.00 per acre will in no way interfere with the rights
of Holidair Lands and/or its other shareholder pursuant to
the Agreement of February, 1971, whereunder Holidair Lands
received its rights to acquire property from the Appellant
(Ex. 5-D).
The Appellant also suggests that the Judgment of the
Court will affect the interest of one Verl O'Brien, who owns
50% of the stock of Major Enterprises, because of some rights
that Verl O'Brien has with respect to the stock in Major
Enterprises owned by Appellant.

Again, contrary to assertions

of the Appellant in his Brief, the Judgment will in no way
affect the rights of Verl O'Brien.

The stock will be pledged
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with the Court, subject to whatever rights Verl O'Brien has,
and can be dealt with by the Court subject only to the rights
of Verl O'Brien.
It should further be noted with respect to the rights
of Verl OfBrien that the Buy and Sell Agreement between Appellant and O'Brien with respect to Major provided for an annual
re-evaluation of the consideration to be paid in the event of
a sale by either one of the shareholders.

The last evaluation

was in 1968. The agreements with respect to buy and sell,
and the evaluation of the stock, were for insurance* purposes,
and at the time of the trial in 1974, did not reflect the real
values (T 1499 through 1501).
It is submitted, then, that the issues raised in
Point VII of Appellant's Brief with respect to affecting the
rights of others, is contrary to the facts and to the Judgments
entered by the Court, and are without merit.

The Judgment wil

in no way affect the rights of the other shareholder in Holidair
Lands (Mr. Rogers), nor the rights of Mr. O'Brien to acquire
Appellant's stock in Major Enterprises. What the Judgments
simply do is assure to the Respondent that the Appellant may
not dispose of his properties without providing for the payments due and owing by the Appellant to the Respondent from
the proceeds of such disposition by the Appellant.

The arrange-

ment simply secures the Respondent's interest, so that she
may not be deprived thereof by the further conduct of the
Appellant.
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CONCLUSION
The Judgment of November 11, 1974, divided the net
marital assets as follows:
TO THE APPELLANT:

$931,602.63

TO THE RESPONDENT:

$743,287.35

The stipulated modification dated December 18, 1974,
resulted in the following division:
TO THE APPELLANT:

$1,131,602.63

TO THE RESPONDENT:

$

543,287.35

The Respondent submits that the division of the
marital estate pursuant to the Judgment of November 11, 1974,
was a fair, just and equitable division thereof, and that
the stipulated modification of December 18, 1974, rendered
the matter even more favorable to the Appellant.
It is obvious that the Appellant has been treated
equitably, and that because thereof, this Court should
either (i) grant the motion of the Respondent set forth at
the conclusion of Respondent's Point I and dismiss the
appeal; (ii) grant the relief prayed for by the Appellant by
setting aside the modification to the Judgment dated December 18,
1974, and declaring that the Judgment of November 11, 1974
is the effective, existing and extant Judgment between the
parties, or (iii) affirm the Judgment of the trial court of
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November 11, 1974, as modified by the stipulated modification
with respect thereto, dated December 18, 1974.

Respectfully submitted,
WATKISS & CAMPBELL

sLOBERT
RO]

S. CAMPBELL, JR.

AMES P. COWLEY
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